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Abstract 
A growing number of innovation policies provide funding for innovation intermediaries, 
with the aim to remedy some of the system failures that occur within local, regional and 
national innovation systems. In order to induce innovation intermediaries to behave in 
accordance with the policies’ objectives, public funding is often conditioned on their 
attainment of minimum performance targets measured through indicators, whose design 
is therefore crucial for the policies’ success. Focusing on the case of a regional policy 
programme in Italy, the paper shows that policymakers’ choice of performance indicators 
that were only loosely tied to the policy’s objectives, prompted intermediaries to adopt 
behaviours that were misaligned with those objectives. The paper then presents a 
reflection on how to design performance indicators that encourage intermediaries to most 
appropriately address relevant failures in their innovation systems. 
 
Keywords: performance-based funding; innovation policy; innovation intermediaries; innovation 
poles; evaluation; technology transfer 
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1. Introduction 
Intermediary organisations that support firm-level and collaborative 
innovation, often called ‘innovation intermediaries’, have gained increasing 
prominence in knowledge-intensive economies (Howells, 2006; Lazaric et al., 
2008). Innovation intermediaries (henceforth: intermediaries) are a varied set of 
organisations that, while differing in nature and status (public, private, or mixed), 
provide ‘linking’ or ‘networking’ services that include, among others, support to 
research and development (R&D) partnership formation and to university-industry 
collaborations. They may also provide other knowledge-intensive services, such 
as knowledge and technology mapping, technical assistance in R&D projects, 
dissemination and commercialisation of results (Bessant and Rush, 1995; Lynn et 
al., 1996; Hargadon and Sutton, 1997; Den Hertog, 2000; Howells, 2006; Lee et 
al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2014). While typical intermediaries include knowledge-
intensive business services providers, technopoles, technology transfer agencies, 
science parks and incubators, a wide range of organizations can provide at least 
some intermediary functions (Howells, 2006). 
Since intermediaries can facilitate knowledge exchange among organisations 
with different languages, cultures, decision-making horizons, systems of 
incentives and objectives (Howells, 2006; Russo and Rossi, 2009; Caloffi et al., 
2015), they can play an important role in promoting innovation within local, 
regional and national innovation systems (Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch, 2013). In 
fact, policies worldwide have relied on intermediaries in order to support R&D, 
innovation, and technology transfer (Martin et al., 2011; Uotila et al., 2012; 
Knockaert et al., 2014; Fiordelmondo et al., 2014).  
In order to induce innovation intermediaries to act in accordance with the 
policies’ objectives, public funding is often conditioned on their achievement of 
certain performance targets. However, this is likely to occur only if there is close 
alignment between the indicators used to measure the targets’ achievement and 
the policies’ intended objectives: hence, the identification of appropriate 
indicators is a complex operation that is crucial for the policy’s success.  
Although a debate is emerging on how to evaluate intermediaries’ 
performance (Nishimura and Okamuro, 2011; Knockaert et al., 2014), little 
research exists on how the use of performance indicators affects the 
intermediaries’ behaviour. Studies of policy implementation have shown that, 
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despite their importance, performance indicators are usually designed 
heuristically, often based on past experience, rather than grounded theoretically 
(Sizer, 1979; Jesson and Mayston, 1990; Curristine, 2005; Molas-Galart and 
Davies, 2006). Heuristic approaches can result in indicators that focus only on a 
few activities, or on relatively unimportant ones, just because they are easier to 
measure (Robichau and Lynn, 2009; Rossi and Rosli, 2015). Such indicators are 
ineffective, not only because they provide a biased evaluation of performance, but 
also because they create an implicit incentive system that alters the behaviour of 
the assessed units (Langford et al., 2006; Compagni and Tediosi, 2012; Rafols et 
al., 2012; Texteira and Koryakina, 2013; Rabovsky, 2014). This incentive system 
can produce undesirable effects if it is not fully aligned with the policy objectives 
(European Commission, 2013; Li, 2015).  
Our study aims to provide a theoretical framework to address the mismatch 
between the policies’ objectives, on the one hand, and the indicators used to 
evaluate the intermediaries’ performance, on the other. It does so by 
conceptualising the variety of activities carried out by intermediaries, and the 
ultimate objectives that they should achieve, in terms of system failures (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005), and by linking the intermediaries’ performance to their 
success in remedying such failures. Indeed, literature has shown that a middle-
range implementation theory is needed, which links inputs to desired community 
outcomes through the actions of an intermediary (Shea, 2011). The system 
failures approach can then provide a guide to the design of appropriate indicators. 
These issues are illustrated through a case study of publicly-funded innovation 
intermediaries in the Italian region of Tuscany in 2011-2014. We show that the 
indicators used to allocate public funding, being only loosely tied to the policy’s 
objectives, induced the intermediaries to pursue behaviours that allowed them to 
reach their performance targets rapidly, but that were misaligned with the policy’s 
ultimate goals. We also show that conceptualising the intermediaries’ objectives 
in terms of addressing system failures could have helped to design more 
appropriate performance indicators. It is worth noting that the case of Tuscany is 
not unique: other Italian regions adopting similar innovation policies used similar 
sets of indicators to evaluate the performance of innovation intermediaries. In 
addition, some of these indicators are among the most commonly used by 
policymakers around the globe (Comacchio and Bonesso, 2012).  
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The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the literature on 
system failures in relation to publicly-funded innovation intermediaries, and we 
propose a framework to conceptualise the intermediaries’ objectives in terms of 
remedying system failures. Section 3 presents the data and sections 4 and 5 
discuss limitations and effects of the indicators used by the regional government. 
Section 6 proposes the use of a systems failure framework to improve the 
evaluation of innovation intermediaries by aligning indicators with the policy 
objectives. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. A systems failure view of publicly-funded innovation intermediaries  
In recent years, innovation intermediaries have been targeted by policies 
supporting innovation and technology transfer, whose aim is to strengthen the 
performance of an innovation system by addressing failures therein (Freeman, 
1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist  and  Johnson, 1997). Intermediaries 
may address all main types of system failures, as identified by Klein Woolthuis et 
al. (2005): infrastructural, capabilities, interaction and institutional failures.  
First, intermediaries can remedy a failure in the information infrastructure of 
the innovation system (Malerba, 2009), by diffusing information about 
opportunities for collaborations with other actors (Bougrain and Haudeville, 
2002), as well as about useful and applicable techniques or technologies for 
product and service development (Howard Partners, 2007; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). 
Second, intermediaries can help firms, particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), to boost their innovation capabilities by directly providing 
training or support services, or by intermediating the provision of services that are 
able to solve the actors’ managerial failures, which are a form of capabilities 
failures (Bessant and Rush, 2005). These failures occur when firms do not know 
how to acquire useful knowledge or technologies, or how to usefully implement 
them into product and services. Moreover, actors may not just lack certain 
knowledge or technologies but they may be unaware of what they are lacking 
(Brusco, 1992; Kaufmann and Tödtling, 2002), which is a form of ‘awareness 
failure’. Through activities such as knowledge and technology mapping, 
innovation intermediaries can help actors gain awareness of what they need, in 
order to find the most appropriate way to obtain it. 
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Third, intermediaries can address interaction failures by creating connections 
between people in different organisations; they can do so through networking 
activities such as targeted introductions and meetings, general networking, and 
provision of appropriate interaction spaces where actors can meet freely 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1998; Acworth, 2008; Kodama, 2008; Rossi et al. 
2010). This can be particularly helpful to newly created firms and SMEs, which 
are usually less open than other organisations to external collaborations (Rothwell 
and Dogdson, 1991). Intermediaries can support interactions also because they are 
(supposed to be) able to bridge different knowledge and competencies. One of 
their main capabilities is precisely that to solve cognitive failures, which occur 
when actors from different institutional backgrounds are too cognitively distant to 
adequately learn together (Nooteboom, 2000), or have different norms, values and 
incentive systems that hinder effective communication (Klerkx and Leuuwis, 
2009).  
Finally, intermediaries can address the lack of formal or informal institutions 
supporting innovation. They can provide firms with information, advice or other 
services related to formal institutions (for example, support with patent search and 
patent licensing). Furthermore, they can facilitate the emergence of social norms 
that underpin good innovative performance, as when their support for 
collaborations promotes mutual trust. 
Table 1 summarizes the key system failures that innovation intermediaries 
can address, and the activities through which they may do so, with the ultimate 
objective to strengthen their innovation system. It can be argued that 
intermediaries’ activities aim to improve the resources (information, networks) 
and capabilities (competences, skills) of the economic actors in the system, thus 
leading them to change their innovative behaviours and achieving better 
innovation performance. 
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Table 1. A system failures framework to conceptualise the key functions and related 
activities of publicly-funded innovation intermediaries  
General 
system failures 
categories 
Specific system 
failures that can 
be addressed by 
intermediaries 
Sources of system failure Examples of innovation 
intermediaries’ activities that can 
help solve system failures 
Infrastructure 
failures 
Information 
failures 
Economic actors lack 
information about sources of 
external knowledge and 
opportunities 
Diffusion of information about 
existing opportunities 
Capabilities 
failures 
Managerial 
failures 
Economic actors are unable to 
exploit knowledge and 
opportunities due to lack of 
adequate competences and 
skills 
Direct provision of knowledge-
intensive services 
Intermediation in the provision of 
knowledge-intensive services 
Training and education activities  
Awareness 
failures 
Economic actors lack 
awareness of their own needs 
for information, knowledge, 
competences 
Knowledge and technology 
mapping 
 
Interaction 
failures 
Networking 
failures  
Economic actors lack 
connections between them, due 
to weak or strong network 
failure 
Targeted introductions and 
meetings  
General networking 
Provision of interaction spaces  
Cognitive failures Economic actors are unable to 
interact due to cognitive 
distance 
Leading collaborative innovation 
projects 
Leading communication within 
interaction spaces 
Mobilizing resources for collective 
initiatives 
Institutional 
failures 
Formal or 
informal 
institutional 
failures 
Economic actors are unwilling 
to innovate due to the lack of 
formal of informal institutions 
Diffusion of information that can 
help the diffusion of formal 
institutions (e.g. on standards or 
IPRs) 
Direct provision of services related 
to formal institutions (e.g., support 
for applying for a license or a 
certification) 
Lobbying activity towards 
policymakers to stimulate the 
creation of formal institutions 
Facilitating the emergence of social 
norms that promote collaboration 
 
 
While the system failure framework provides an implicit or explicit rationale 
for the public funding of innovation intermediaries, policymakers rarely allocate 
such public funding based on the intermediaries’ ability to deal with system 
failures. When funding is conditioned to the achievement of minimum targets in 
certain performance indicators, the latter are usually defined in terms of the 
intermediaries’ production of specific outputs that are considered desirable in 
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themselves, without a clear link to how achieving such targets would serve the 
policy objective to address certain system failures. Moreover, little attention is 
paid to the behavioural incentives that performance indicators create, in order to 
ensure that they are aligned with the policy objectives (Comacchio and Bonesso, 
2012; European Commission, 2013).  
It is well known that policymakers’ choice of performance indicators can 
influence the behaviour of the funding recipients. As aptly pointed out by Fitz-
Gibbon (1990, p. 2) “for every performance indicator questions must be asked 
about the implicit messages, and the behavioural implications. In other words, 
knowing that certain indicators are being collected and monitored, what 
implications do people draw? How will they respond to the situation?”. 
Intermediaries may aim for good performance scores in the indicators, 
disregarding other potentially important objectives, the attainment of some of 
which may not be easily measurable. Intermediaries may also be tempted to 
engage in activities that produce immediate outputs, and neglect activities that 
would yield results only over a longer time horizon than that considered by 
evaluators. For example, Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen (2012) showed how, in the 
case of the Forny technology transfer programme in Norway, the indicators used 
to determine the annual bonus payments for technology transfer offices had to be 
changed several times, since the latter would alter their strategies in line with the 
incentives created by the indicators, sometimes with adverse consequences. In 
particular, using the number of spinoff companies as an indicator of performance 
led them to launch too many firms too early.  
Efforts should be made to identify performance indicators that encourage 
intermediaries to most appropriately address relevant system failures. To do so, 
first, policymakers should identify the full range of intermediaries’ activities and 
pay particular attention to those that are instrumental in addressing the key 
failures, this way avoiding the risk of omitting important activities from the 
evaluation just because they are less visible or less easy to measure. Second, 
policymakers should devise performance indicators that encourage intermediaries 
to remedy the sources of system failures. Most of the indicators that are used in 
practice refer to the outputs that intermediaries produce (Comacchio and Bonesso, 
2012) (for example: how many patents have they applied for, or have they 
facilitated? How many collaboration agreements have they signed? How many 
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services have they provided?). Instead, indicators should be closely linked to the 
outcomes that the economic actors in the system achieve thanks to the activity of 
the intermediaries. It must be noted that, recently, numerous criticisms of output 
indicators have led to greater emphasis on the use of outcome indicators (or 
results indicators), also in the evaluation of regional policy (European 
Commission, 2014). However, the use of outcome indicators in itself does not 
necessarily address the mismatch between the policy objectives and the indicators 
defined by policymakers. Building on the system failures framework outlined in 
Table 1, we argue that performance indicators should measure whether the 
economic actors have acquired resources (information, services, contacts) and 
have engaged in learning processes that have allowed them to improve their 
capabilities to engage in innovation (for example, through better communication 
and negotiation skills, greater awareness of their own abilities and of their 
limitations, greater understanding of the process of collaboration, greater trust and 
openness toward external collaborations) which in turn have led to changes in 
their behaviours (for example, greater networking activity, changes in the types of 
partners they interact with, changes in the type of innovation processes they 
perform) and possibly in performance (more innovation, greater profitability and 
so on).  
 
3. The regional innovation poles  
We rely on a case study to illustrate the implications of the mismatch between 
performance indicators and the policy’s ultimate objectives, and to showcase an 
improved approach to performance evaluation. The case study concerns a policy 
intervention implemented by the Italian region of Tuscany in 2011-2014, through 
which the regional government funded twelve innovation poles, a particular type 
of innovation intermediary. Poles were consortia between universities and re-
search centres, knowledge-intensive service providers and firms. Each consortium 
was led by a managing organisation that decided what services to provide and 
how to organize the poles’ many activities. Firms that intended to use an innova-
tion pole’s services would have to gain membership of that pole. 
The policy intervention relied on two complementary instruments: the crea-
tion of the poles and the provision of grants to buy knowledge-intensive services. 
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With the first instrument, Tuscany’s regional government identified a set of key 
technologies/applications, and launched a call for tender (in 2010) inviting organi-
sations to submit proposals for the creation of poles for a three-year period (2011-
2014). The aim was to strengthen the regional infrastructure supporting innova-
tion, by stimulating collaborations between existing organisations that performed 
innovation intermediary functions. Before this policy, the region hosted a relative-
ly large set of small-scale intermediaries, which often did not reach the minimum 
size needed to efficiently provide enterprises with high quality services (IRIS 
Toscana, 2008). The new, larger intermediaries were expected to act more vigor-
ously to support innovation in local firms. For the first three years, the poles were 
experimental in character. Afterwards, having evaluated their accomplishments, 
the policymaker would then decide how to structure subsequent interventions. Ta-
ble 2 lists, for each innovation pole that had been selected for funding, its key 
technology/application, the number of organisations in the consortium and the 
number of members at the start (30.6.2011) and end (30.6.2014) of the three-year 
period. 
 
Table 2.Key technologies/applications, consortium participants, pole members  
Innovation pole 
(acronym) 
Key technologies/applications N. of 
organisatio
ns in the 
consortium 
N. of pole 
members as 
of 
30.06.2011 
N. of pole 
members 
as of  
30.06.2014 
OPTOSCANA Optoelectronics for manufacturing and 
aerospace 
2 67 92 
INNOPAPER Paper 1 89 139 
OTIR 2020 Fashion (textiles, apparel, leather, 
shoes, jewellery) 
7 223 501 
VITA Life science 8 41 158 
PIETRE Marble 4 52 122 
PENTA Shipbuilding and maritime technology 5 225 352 
POLIS Technologies for sustainable cities 8 228 643 
NANOXM Nanotechnologies 6 70 128 
CENTO Furniture and interior design 6 177 322 
PIERRE Renewable energies and energy saving 
technology 
13 120 368 
POLO12 Mechanics, particularly for automotive 
and transport 
6 198 390 
POLITER ICT and robotics 13 195 697 
Source: our elaborations using data provided by Tuscany’s Regional government 
 
The poles received regional funds to carry out the following activities: 
1. marketing to recruit new members, including technology mapping activi-
ties to encourage firms to demand knowledge-intensive services and to in-
vest in innovation; 
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2. direct provision of knowledge-intensive services; 
3. participation in regional, national and European R&D projects; organisa-
tion of knowledge transfer programmes, workshops and seminars to facili-
tate knowledge sharing and networking among members;  
4. management of open access infrastructures such as research laboratories. 
The second instrument aimed to encourage local firms to join the poles and 
participate in their activities: firms that bought knowledge-intensive services that 
were either directly provided or intermediated by the poles, would be given a sub-
sidy equal to 80% on the service price.
1
 
The policymaker expected the poles to expand the pool of users of innovation 
services, particularly involving those SMEs that had little understanding of their 
needs and were unable to express a ‘demand for innovation’. By recruiting new 
member firms and mapping their needs, the poles would help firms to find the 
most appropriate knowledge-intensive services. In turn, by gaining access to 
knowledge-intensive services, SMEs would improve their innovation capabilities, 
which would generate positive spillovers in the regional innovation system.  
Public funding was allocated to innovation poles in two instalments: up to 
70% over the course of the three years, and the rest at the end. The funding was 
conditional upon the achievement of a set of minimum performance targets, which 
had to be reached by the end of the three-year period. The tender stated that 
innovation poles would be assigned to one of three possible ‘bands’ depending on 
how many members they had at the time of their launch. Different performance 
targets were set for the different bands. Targets were defined as minimum 
thresholds with respect to several indicators:  
i) percentage increase in the number of member firms;  
ii) number of member firms that were offered knowledge and technology 
mapping services;  
iii) number of services provided to firms, and revenue from the sale of 
 
 
1 This incentive existed before the creation of the poles: since 2008, SMEs could apply for public 
subsidies for the purchase of various types of knowledge-intensive services. The admission to 
the incentive was semi-automatic (it was based on compliance with a set of formal criteria, in-
cluding company size) and granted a reduction in the range of 20-60% on the cost of the service. 
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services. 
Table 3 shows, for each band, the minimum number of members required at 
the start of the period, the performance targets to be achieved over the three years, 
and the maximum funding that poles could claim from the regional government 
had they reached these targets. The performance target had been set at the start of 
the policy programme and poles were aware of these targets from the start.  
 
Table 3. Performance targets and maximum funding that could be claimed by innovation 
poles in each of the three bands 
 Criterion for 
allocation into 
bands: 
Performance targets to be achieved within three years 
(minimum thresholds) 
Maximum 
funding that 
could be 
claimed from 
the Regional 
government 
 
N. member 
firms(at 
launch) 
% increase 
in the 
number of  
member 
firms 
N. firms to 
be offered  
knowledge 
& 
technology  
mapping 
services   
N. firms to 
be offered 
knowledge-
intensive 
services 
 
Revenue 
from the 
sale of 
services 
 
Band 1 > 160 50 160 40 500,000 € 800,000 € 
Band 2 > 80 50 80 20 300,000 € 600,000 € 
Band 3 > 40 50 40 10 150,000 € 400,000 € 
Source: our elaborations using data provided by Tuscany’s Regional government 
 
 
In what follows we discuss these indicators in the light of their adequacy to 
promote the achievement of the policy’s objectives, and we provide some 
evidence about the extent to which they induced behaviours that were misaligned 
with these objectives. 
Our empirical analysis builds upon several data sources, listed in Table 4, 
which the authors assembled as part of a research team engaged in the analysis of 
the policy programme.  
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Table 4. Data sources  
Type of data Source 
Data on poles’ 
structure and 
activities 
 Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (poles’ six-
months activity reports and other administrative data) 
 Poles’ websites (collected in September – January 2015) 
 27 semi-structured interviews with staff from the organisations managing the 
innovation poles, some member firms and local business associations (carried 
out between March and May 2014), 
 Online survey of poles’ managing organisations about the monitoring and 
evaluation activities they had to comply with (March-April 2015)2 
 Focus group with poles’ managing organisations (May 2015) 
Data on member firms  Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (data on the 
policy providing grants to buy knowledge-intensive services) 
 Interviews to poles’ member firms, carried out between September and 
November 2015 
Data on regional 
administration 
 Administrative data provided by Tuscany’s regional government (funding 
schemes for poles and member firms) 
 4 interviews with policymakers (carried out between March and May 2014) 
Data on 2000-2006 
innovation policies 
 Previous research projects of the authors  
 
 
4. Limitations of the indicators used by the regional government 
In order to identify any mismatches between the ultimate aim of the policy 
and the performance indicators that were established by the regional policymaker, 
we review the indicators in light of the objectives stated in the policy documents 
(Table 5). The key objectives of innovation poles were listed as follows (Regione 
Toscana, 2010):  
1. To promote and meet the demand for innovation on the part of local firms, 
particularly SMEs and more fragile firms, which are not able to express 
such demand; 
2. To expand the number of firms accessing high value-added knowledge-
intensive services, in order to promote the diffusion of innovation across 
pole members and with external firms; 
3. To help firms gain access to scientific and technological knowledge, and 
to networks and resources at national and international level; 
4. To support the sharing of equipment and of research, development, testing 
 
 
2 The first email inviting the managing organisations to take part in the survey was sent on March 
27
th
, 2015, followed by two recalls sent to non-respondents only. 14 (30%) out of the 46 manag-
ing organisations responded to the survey, 12 of these being the consortium leaders for the 12 
poles. We focused our analysis on the 12 completed questionnaires received from the 12 consor-
tium leaders. 
14 
and certification labs. 
For some of these objectives, the policymaker clearly expresses the need to 
address specific system failures. For instance the first objective referred to aware-
ness problems that could prevent SMEs from identifying their main needs and de-
vising appropriate strategies to satisfy them. In other cases, the reference to spe-
cific types of system failures was more implicit, but it can nevertheless be de-
duced from reading the documents (Table 5, first column). 
By establishing a logical link between the objectives of the policy, on the one 
hand, and the performance indicators designed by the regional policymaker, on 
the other hand, we can identify whether these indicators created behavioural in-
centives that were misaligned with the policy objectives (Table 5, third column). 
The table shows that the policy objectives that the poles should have achieved 
(and the underlying types of system failures that the poles should have addressed), 
and the indicators used by the regional government to measure such achievement, 
were not clearly connected: instead, the indicators appeared only loosely tied to 
the policy objectives, and could easily incentivise the poles to adopt behaviours 
that were misaligned with the objectives of the policy. 
The first policy objective (to promote and meet SMEs’ demand for innova-
tion) intended to address information and awareness failures: to remedy the 
SMEs’ lack of information about technologies and innovation opportunities, and 
their lack of awareness of their own technological needs. The policymaker defined 
two indicators (minimum percentage increase in number of members and in the 
number of new member firms to be offered knowledge and technology mapping 
services) that measured the poles’ engagement in recruiting members and market-
ing services to them. However, these indicators did not capture whether and to 
what extent the poles had been successful in solving the information and aware-
ness failures that could affect local firms. These indicators may even have under-
mined the attainment of this objective since, in order to easily reach the target, 
poles could have chosen to approach firms that were easy to reach (e.g. firms that 
were already known to the poles’ consortium members before the start of the 
poles’ activities) rather than the most fragile firms, with greater awareness prob-
lems. The remaining two indicators (minimum number of firms to be offered 
knowledge-intensive services, and minimum revenue from the sale of services) 
may be related to the second policy objective, which was to address, and possibly 
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solve, managerial failures. However, also in this case the indicators were not di-
rectly measuring whether the poles had been successful in addressing managerial 
failures in regional firms, and, indeed, the indicators may have undermined the at-
tainment of the second objective: in order to easily reach the targets, poles could 
have provided services to firms that were more willing to buy services (e.g., to 
firms that were already used to buy services or to more innovative firms) rather 
than to firms that had the greatest managerial problems. 
 
Table 5. Policy objectives, performance indicators, and misaligned incentives 
Policy objective 
(type of system failure ad-
dressed) 
Performance indicators Misalignment between poles’ in-
centives and policy objectives 
Poles should promote and meet 
the demand for innovation, par-
ticularly in SMEs and more frag-
ile firms who were unable to ex-
press such demand 
(Information failures, awareness 
failures) 
% increase in number of members  
Minimum number of new member 
firms to be offered knowledge and 
technology mapping services  
In order to easily reach the target, 
poles could have chosen firms that 
were easy to reach (e.g. firms that 
were known to the poles before-
hand)  
Poles should expand the number 
of firms accessing high value-
added knowledge-intensive ser-
vices 
(Managerial failures) 
Minimum number of firms to be 
offered knowledge-intensive ser-
vices 
Minimum revenue from the sale of 
services  
In order to easily reach the target, 
poles could have provided services 
to firms that were more willing to 
buy services (e.g. to firms that 
were already used to buy services 
or to more innovative firms ) and 
not to the other types of firms  
Poles should help firms gain ac-
cess to scientific and tech 
knowledge, and to networks and 
resources at national and interna-
tional level 
Poles should support the sharing 
of equipment and certification 
labs  
(Networking failures, cognitive 
failures) 
-- Poles could have chosen not to 
perform these activities (or put a 
very little effort in performing such 
activities) because they are not rel-
evant to assess their performance  
 
The policymaker also had two other objectives. However, no performance in-
dicators were set that could be linked to those. This is an important mismatch be-
tween policy objectives and indicators, whose effect in creating misaligned incen-
tives for the poles is easy to imagine. Poles could have chosen not to perform 
these activities (or to put a very little effort into them) because they were not rele-
vant to their performance evaluation.   
In what follows we focus on the empirical analysis of the potentially misa-
ligned incentives created by performance indicators, while in section 6 we put 
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forward a reflection on what process and outcome indicators could be used to 
support intermediaries in addressing system failures. 
 
5. Misalignment between poles’ incentives and policy objectives 
Table 6 summarizes the results achieved by each innovation pole in the 
period 2011-2014, ordered by band, and highlights those cases in which the 
targets had been reached in less than half the time allocated to these activities. 
 
Table 6. Performance targets and their achievement  
Innovation pole % increase in 
the number of 
member firms 
(above the 
minimum initial 
threshold for 
each band) 
Firms with 
knowledge and 
technology 
mapping 
Services 
provided 
Revenue 
 
% n. n. € 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 1 
50% 160 40 500,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
OTIR 2020 213%* 278* 93 1,592,970* 
PENTA 120%* 236* 100 911,084* 
POLIS 303%* 274* 88 1,022,348* 
CENTO 101%* 190 115* 1,739,283* 
POLO12 146%* 249* 267* 1,924,012* 
POLITER 338%* 286* 191* 2,259,204* 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 2 
50% 80 20 300,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
INNOPAPER 73%* 94 455* 711,608* 
PIERRE 363%* 120 64* 1,082,638* 
 
Minimum target for 
Band 3 
50% 40 10 150,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
OPTOSCANA 130%* 56 42* 312,210* 
VITA 295%* 73* 31 249,893* 
PIETRE 205%* 81 18 1,799,400* 
NANOXM 222%* 44* 25 880,223* 
Note to table: * Poles that achieved the target within the first three semesters of activity. 
Source: our elaborations using data provided by the innovation poles to document their performance, 
reference period: 1st July 2011-30th June 2014 
 
Even a quick glance at the poles’ performance suggests that the targets were 
probably too low, given that most poles reached them very rapidly. All poles 
reached at least one of the performance targets within the first six months, and 
most of them had reached at least two targets within the first year. Moreover, all 
poles had reached all their performance target within two years. While the targets 
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could have been easy to reach in an absolute sense, this may also suggest the 
presence of incentives for the poles to act in ways that were misaligned with the 
policy’s objectives: innovation poles may have strategically implemented actions 
aimed at achieving the targets, regardless of whether such actions were aligned 
with their ultimate objectives to address failures in the innovation system. To 
assess whether this might have been the case, we investigate several ways in 
which performance indicators might have affected the behaviour of the innovation 
poles. 
In order to do so, we try to define some very simple indicators that can be 
used to identify the potential misalignment between the poles’ incentives, on the 
one hand, and the policy objectives put forward in Table 5, on the other. 
 
5.1. Misaligned incentives created by indicators related to the first objective. 
Recruiting members among firms that were easy to reach and mapping their 
needs. To check whether poles recruited and provided mapping services to firms 
that were easy to reach, for example those they had already worked with prior to 
the policy programme, rather than focus on firms that were outside their 
established networks, we investigate how many of the member firms and of the 
mapped firms had been known to the poles’ managing organisations before the 
start of the policy. We infer that firms and managing organisations knew each 
other if they had participated together in previous regional policy interventions. 
Based on information gathered from archives related to previous regional policies 
that supported R&D collaborations, we found that, on average, 20.3% of member 
firms had already cooperated with the poles’ managing organisations. This 
percentage ranged from almost 50% for Optoscana, a pole managed by 
organisations that had been very active in the 2000-2006 policies, to 3.8% for 
Penta, whose leading organisation (Navigo) was not involved in the 2000-2006 
policies. During their three years of activity, the poles’ managing organisations 
continued to attract firms that had been their partners in previous policies, but at a 
decreasing rate. The share of mapped firms that had participated with the poles in 
the previous 2000-2006 policy programme climbed, over time, to about 50% on 
average. 
Member recruitment without further activity. To check whether poles simply 
recruited members without intending to work closely with them, but just to 
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achieve their membership targets, we calculated how many of the member firms 
did not buy any services from the poles, and did not engage in any activity 
intermediated by the poles. On average, the poles involved only 2 member firms 
out 10 in some innovation-related activities during the three-year period. The 
remaining 8 firms interacted with the poles in order to gain membership, but were 
not subsequently involved in any other activity. In particular, out of the 3066 
member firms, only 586 firms bought some innovation service offered directly by 
the poles of which they were members (19.1%). A further 75 firms bought 
services from other poles, without being members.  
 
5.2. Misaligned incentives created by indicators related to the second objective: 
providing services to firms that were already accustomed to demanding them, or 
to firms that were already innovative.  
If we consider only the 586 firms that bought services from the poles, 206 
firms (35.2%), had already benefited from a public incentive to buy knowledge in-
tensive services, before the poles were created, and 34 of these (5.8%) had already 
participated in the 2000-2006 regional innovation policy programmes. 
Table 7 summarizes the extent to which poles offered services to member 
firms that had already requested services from the previous policy programme. 
The table shows that, on average, over a third (35.2%) of the member firms to 
which poles provided services had already been accustomed to requesting services 
beforehand. These firms accounted for 27.2% of the services provided and 42.7% 
of the value of these services. So, these firms on average demanded more expen-
sive (which generally meant more complex and more knowledge-intensive) ser-
vices. It is also interesting to observe that, of the 206 firms that had already re-
quested services from the previous policy programmes, almost half (92, that is 
15.7% of the set of firms that bought services from the poles) went on to demand 
the same type of services from the poles. For these firms, the poles appear to have 
simply crowded out other service providers.   
In addition, we found that 60% of the firms that demanded services from the 
poles were innovative firms, i.e. before the start of the policy they had carried out 
either internal R&D activities or external R&D in collaboration with other 
organisations, while this percentage drops to 10% in the group of member firms 
that did not buy any services. 
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Table 7. Service provision to member firms that were already accustomed to demand ser-
vices  
Pole 
Member firms that had already requested services from the previous policy pro-
gramme before requesting them from the poles: 
 
Number of firms, as a 
share of member firms  
Number of services 
provided, as a share of 
services provided to 
member firms 
Value of services provid-
ed, as a share of the value 
of services provided to 
member firms 
OPTOSCANA 22.2% 20.6% 1.3% 
INNOPAPER 25.7% 8.3% 28.9% 
OTIR 2020 43.8% 47.1% 79.4% 
VITA 12.5% 8.8% 17.9% 
PIETRE - - - 
PENTA 27.3% 34.5% 47.3% 
POLIS 45.8% 48.6% 57.1% 
NANOXM 36.4% 40.0% 33.8% 
CENTO 36.2% 43.7% 58.4% 
PIERRE 28.6% 25.4% 28.1% 
POLO12 28.4% 24.9% 42.6% 
POLITER 45.5% 45.5% 53.6% 
average 35.2% 27.2% 42.7% 
 
 
5.3. Misaligned incentives created by indicators related to the third objective: 
avoiding activities whose performance was not measured by indicators.  
Our survey of the poles’ managing organisations suggests that 11 poles out of 
12 carried out activities in order to support member firms’ access to scientific and 
technological knowledge, and to networks and resources at national and 
international level. However, about 40% of the member firms that we interviewed 
claimed to have been contacted by the poles only once, with the objective to 
recruit them as members. 
Based on this information, poles seem to have put very little effort in 
performing these activities, even if they were required to achieve some policy 
objectives. Therefore, also in this case the indicators (or lack thereof) seem to 
have produced misaligned incentives. 
Summarizing, through our empirical analysis we found some evidence that 
the poles adopted behaviours that were misaligned with the policy’s objectives. 
Poles built their network of members by extensively relying on their network of 
pre-existing connections, and engaged with their members to a limited extent: 8 
member firms out of 10 did not demand any knowledge intensive services, and 
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40% did not have any contact with the poles after they had gained membership. 
Many of the services were provided to firms that did not need the poles’ 
intermediation. We found that 35.2% of the firms that demanded services from the 
poles would have been able to buy them even without the intermediation of the 
poles; for half of these firms, the poles simply crowded out other services 
providers instead of providing different services. Activities for which performance 
targets had not been set, were carried out only to a limited extent. 
  
6. Towards a better approach to evaluating the performance of innovation 
intermediaries 
The performance indicators used by the regional government had several 
limitations. First, they were incomplete because they only focused on some of the 
poles’ activities. Second, they were not explicitly designed to support the 
achievement of policy objectives. Much of the recent debate on the evaluation of 
intermediaries’ performance focuses on the need to introduce outcome indicators 
that capture significant changes in the behaviours of beneficiary firms and 
significant social and economic effects at various levels of analysis. However, 
while the use of outcome indicators is crucial in order to understand the overall 
effects of the policy programme, it might not in itself correct the misalignment 
between the incentives created by the indicators and the policy’s objectives, if the 
indicators are not aligned with the latter. Instead, we argue that the key problem 
when defining performance targets and performance indicators (especially, but not 
only, when they are used to allocate public funding) is to closely align such 
indicators with the policy’s objectives.  
Building on the conceptualisation of the policy’s objectives in terms of 
system failures as outlined in Table 1, we can identify a number of indicators that 
could have been used for performance evaluation. These indicators could have 
measured the outputs of the poles’ activities, both direct ones (activities 
performed by the poles) and indirect ones (follow up activities that resulted from 
the former). It would have been important to also include (if the policy’s time 
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scale allowed it) the outcomes achieved by the beneficiary firms thanks to the 
poles’ activities.3 Outcome indicators could have measured whether the economic 
actors had changed their behaviours (for example, greater networking activity, 
changes in the types of partners they interact with, changes in the type of 
innovation processes they perform) and possibly in performance (more 
innovation, greater profitability and so on), as a consequence of having acquired 
resources (information, services, contacts) and engaged in learning processes that 
had allowed them to improve their capabilities to engage in innovation (for 
example, through better communication and negotiation skills, greater awareness 
of their own abilities and of their limitations, greater understanding of the process 
of collaboration, greater trust and openness toward external collaborations), 
thanks to the poles’ activities. 
Table 8 summarizes the possible measures for the evaluation of the poles’ 
performance, which result from an integration of our proposed conceptual 
framework with our empirical findings. The proposed measures are classified by 
policy objective, and corresponding system failures, and by their type (direct 
output, indirect output, or outcome indicators). 
The indicators proposed here refer to the case of innovation poles, but they 
can be easily adapted to many types of intermediaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 In order to capture the actual contribution of the innovation poles to the changes in the behav-
iours of the beneficiary firms, outcomes can be evaluated not just descriptively but also causally, 
through the counterfactual tools of the so-called econometrics of program evaluation (Imbens 
and Rubin, 2015). However, the application of these tools to the field of system failures is still in 
its infancy. 
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Table 8. Policy objectives, expected outcomes and proposed indicators 
Types of system 
failures addressed 
Proposed indicators 
Information failures, 
awareness failures 
Direct output: Number of new (not previously known) firms recruited 
Direct output: Number of new (not previously known) firms mapped 
Indirect output: Number and value of follow-up activities carried out with the firms 
recruited 
Indirect output: Number of new firms that were offered mapping services, that 
engaged in follow-up activities 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ internal innovation behaviour: nature and types of 
investments in innovation; nature and value of the research project proposals 
submitted and funded; types of innovation strategies 
Managerial failures Direct output: Number and value of services provided or intermediated by the 
innovation intermediary to firms that had not demanded that kind of services before, 
or that had never demanded services 
Direct output: number of firms receiving services directly provided or mediated by 
the innovation intermediary that had not demanded that kind of services before, or 
that had never demanded services 
Indirect output: Number and value of subsequent services provided to these firms 
Indirect output: Number of firms receiving services that requested further services 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ demand for knowledge-intensive services: number of 
firms demanding services, number of services demanded 
Networking failures, 
cognitive failures 
Direct output: Number of events held (by type of event)  
Direct output: Number of firms participating in events 
Indirect output: Number and value of follow-up activities carried out with these 
firms 
Indirect output: Number of firms involved in events, that engaged in follow-up 
activities 
Outcome: Changes in firms’ networking behaviour: size and composition of 
networks of relationships; number and types of collaborative projects 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
In recent years, policymakers have relied on intermediaries to stimulate the 
innovative capacity of firms (especially those that are not able to express their 
demand for innovation), to find new partners to work with, new knowledge and 
new technologies. In addition, intermediaries can play an important role in 
strengthening the connections between actors within an innovation system. How-
ever, if the intermediaries’ incentives are not aligned to the pursuit of these objec-
tives, there are few reasons to believe that these objectives will be achieved. 
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While evaluation exercises often analyse whether the intermediaries’ 
behaviour was in line with the stated aims of the policy, very rarely they seek to 
understand the extent to which this behaviour was affected by the policy design. 
Our study attempts to bring to light the possible misaligned incentives created by 
linking the allocation of funding to performance indicators that are not fully in 
line with the policy’s objectives. 
The evidence suggests that the policy had incentivised the poles to focus on 
some activities and not on others, and to provide support to firms that did not 
necessarily need it. Two further issues have been implicitly raised by our analysis. 
First, while the chosen performance indicators seem to have generated some 
misaligned incentives, this does not mean that the policy as a whole was 
ineffective. Establishing this would have required an appropriate ex post 
evaluation, possibly including a counterfactual analysis. Second, establishing 
performance-based indicators is very important, although not always easy. Indeed, 
this activity is constrained by the presence of a trade-off. By setting indicators that 
are simple to compute and not too demanding in terms of data requirements, the 
intermediaries only need to invest a limited amount of resources in the evaluation 
process, and can engage in more productive activities instead. But indicators are 
often too loosely related to the policy’s ultimate objectives to address failures both 
at firm level and at system level. To achieve a balance it is necessary, first of all, 
to single out, for each of the policy objectives, what are the short and medium 
term expected outcomes of the policy. Then, output measures for intermediaries' 
performance – aligned with those outcomes – may include a wide range of 
indicators, such as, for example, those that we defined in Table 8, which are 
strongly connected with the policy objectives, and may directly incentivise 
intermediaries to become more effective. 
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